Vocational Training Council

VTC Institutional Repository
Technological and Higher Education Institute of
Hong Kong (THEi) Staff Publications

Support & Other Units

1991

Europe 1992: economic implications for Asia
David Lim
Griffith University, dlim@vtc.edu.hk

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.vtc.edu.hk/thei-adm-others-sp
Part of the Regional Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Lim, D. (1991). Europe 1992: economic implications for Asia. Asian Studies Review, 15 (1), 49-58.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03147539108712743

This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open
access by the Support & Other Units at VTC Institutional
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Technological and Higher Education Institute of Hong
Kong (THEi) Staff Publications by an authorized
administrator of VTC Institutional Repository. For more
information, please contact wchu@vtc.edu.hk.

Europe 1992: economic implications for Asia
David Lim
Griffith University
The European Economic Community (EEC) was formed in 1957 with the signing of the Treaty
of Rome. This brought together six countries (Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy,
Luxemburg and the Netherlands) which were involved in the conflict of the Second World
War. The impetus for the establishment of the EEC was political but the economic gains
from the operation of the scheme, popularly known as the Common Market, were so
significant that eventually the original membership of six was doubled to include Denmark,
Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom.
The so-called Europe 1992 Project aims to bring about further economic co- operation in the
EEC, now known as the European Community (EC), by removing all the current major
obstacles to intra-European trade. These include red tape and border regulations, restrictive
government procurement practices, differences in technical regulations and standards, and
differences in tax regulations, accounting standards and social security laws.
The impetus for the 1992 plan is the belief that these barriers were largely responsible for
the EC having lower output, investment, productivity and employment growth rates and
higher inflation rates than the USA and Japan. The EC also did not do as well in the export
market. In the period 1979-85, its share in the world export market fell in spite of a 35 per
cent decrease in its effective exchange rate. The poor export performance was especially
noticeable in the industries of the future, such as information technology, electrical and
office equipment and telecommunications.
The Europe 1992 Project has generated a great deal of interest and anxiety, not least among
the major trading nations of Asia. This article examines the economic and trade implications
of the 1992 program for these countries.
The plan
If realised, the Europe 1992 plan will represent a very high level of economic cooperation.
The lowest level of cooperation is the formation of a free-trade area, where member
countries remove trade barriers among themselves but maintain their own separate
national barriers against trade with the outside world. The 1992 plan goes beyond this as
well as the next stage of forming a customs union, where member countries maintain no
obstacles on trade with each other and have the same set of obstacles against trade with
non-member countries. From 1957 to now the EC has operated such a system, together
with other arrangements. The 1992 plan aims for a common market where a customs union
operates and where there is complete freedom of movement for capital and labour. The
highest stage of economic cooperation will be full economic union where member countries
become, in effect, part of a bigger country, under the same set of economic policies.
The fears that the trading nations of Asia have of the Europe 1992 plan are in the following
areas:

•

•

•

By abolishing all trade barriers among the member countries, the plan will
encourage them to buy from each other and divert trade from non- member
countries, even though the latter might be more efficient. This is the so-called trade
diversion effect.
Combining a population of 325 million people with very high income levels, the plan
will give the group extraordinary bargaining strength and drawing power. These will
be used as leverage to open foreign markets or to keep out all those whose markets
are highly protected, on terms which are favourable to the EC. This is the so-called
"Fortress Europe" effect.
The EC may give special trade preferences to eastern Europe and divert its private
and official capital flows to it at the expense of Asian countries. Some diversion may
also take place with funds from richer EC countries going to poorer EC countries such
as Spain and Portugal rather than to Asian countries.

Trade diversion
This fear is based on the fact that the EC is an important market for Asian exports and that
the EC has increased its overall level of protection against developing countries in the 1980s.
Table 1 shows that the EC's share of Asian exports in 1989 was over 30 per cent and had
increased over the 1980-89 period. The EC was also the second most important destination
after the US. For South Asian countries it remained the most important export market.

The increase in the EC's share of Asian exports hides some very disturbing trends. Protection
in EC has become more discriminatory against certain products from certain countries and
also very sophisticated and non-transparent. The newly industrialising economies (NIEs),
especially those in Asia, have been affected particularly and the second-generation
exporting nations from Asia have also been increasingly targeted. Non-tariff barriers have
replaced tariffs, and among the non-tariff barriers quantitative restrictions have been
replaced by voluntary export restraints, surveillance and anti-dumping procedures which
are partly outside the jurisdiction of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
These changes in the nature of protection have made it easier for the EC to camouflage its
level of protection and more difficult for its competitors to break into or maintain their
share of the EC market.
In contrast to these trade restrictions, the EC's trade preferences to developing countries
are of limited value. They are generous for the export of manufactured goods from
countries which cannot supply them, such as the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP)
countries of the Lomé Convention, and much less so for the export of agricultural and
manufactured goods from those which can.
The fear that the trade diversion effect will be substantial is not allayed by the stand taken
by the EC in the Uruguay Round. It has not been keen to reduce agricultural protection or to
give up the principle of special treatment and selectivity in its trade with non-EC countries.
It should be pointed out that the negative trade diversion effect from the establishment of a
trade bloc may be offset by the positive trade creation effect. This refers to the possibility of
new trade between the member countries of the EC once barriers to trade are removed,
when some of them will be encouraged to replace domestically produced goods by goods
produced more efficiently by other member countries.
It has been estimated that this reallocation of production activities, together with the free
movement of capital and labour, will bring about structural change and increase the EC's
GDP by 1 per cent per year well into the 1990s.1 Other important economic gains are an
average annual decrease of 6.1 per cent in the level of consumer prices, an improvement in
the budget by an average of 2.2 per cent of GDP, an improvement in the external balance by
an average of 1 per cent of GDP, and 1.8 million jobs being created which would reduce the
unemployment rate by 1.5 per cent.
If the income elasticity of import demand remains the same over the 1990s, the resulting
increase in the EC's imports will be far greater than the resulting decrease from the trade
diversion. It has been estimated that an annual increase in the GDP of 1 per cent will
increase imports by 5.5 per cent per year, with the trade diversion being no more than one
fifth of the increase in import demand.2 The major beneficiaries of the increase in EC's
import demand will be countries which can supply manufactured goods and services at
competitive prices, and this includes the major trading nations of Asia. Those countries
which export primary products will benefit less as technology in Europe continues to save
on raw materials and to conserve the environment.
A recent study on the ex ante effect of the EC 1992 plan on South Korean exports to the EC
suggests that too much has been made of the adverse effects.3 The plan will produce an

immediate static effect in reducing the prices of EC goods: trading costs will be reduced
from less delay at the frontier as will production costs from greater competition and
economies of large-scale production. However, this will reduce Korean exports to the EC by
only 2.4 per cent on the average. There is also a long-term dynamic effect which will reduce
it by 5.6 per cent. These losses will be insignificant compared to the increase in exports
generated by the increase in the EC's GDP.
Fortress Europe
The second area of concern that the trading nations of Asia have of the 1992 Europe plan is
that it may operate as "Fortress Europe". It may erect substantially more barriers against
competition from the rest of the world in an attempt to reduce the overall competitive
shock from having a single European market, or it may make use of its enormous combined
strength to extract unfair gains from the rest of the world.
Possible forms of the move towards "Fortress Europe" might include the following:
•

•
•

EC members might impose on non-members the harshest form of protection
currently used by one of them while abolishing such restrictions among themselves.
This might happen with textiles and automobiles which are among a small number of
products on which national quotas are still imposed.
The EC might deny national treatment for non-EC firms seeking to enter the EC
market through the establishment of subsidiaries, so that foreign- owned
subsidiaries are treated less favourably than domestically-owned ones.
The EC could interpret the principle of reciprocity strictly so that foreign- owned
subsidiaries would be granted the benefits of the integrated market only if EC
subsidiaries in the foreign country were to enjoy similar benefits.

The move towards "Fortress Europe" may materialise because of the more protectionist and
discriminatory trade policies pursued by the EC over the last twenty years and the
increasing use of non-tariff barriers, as noted already. There is also talk in official documents
and statements from the EC of the integrated internal market giving the EC the negotiating
leverage to obtain global reciprocity, as well as sectoral reciprocity in certain areas not
covered by GATT, especially services.
The decision by a large number of Japanese manufacturers (for example, Fujitsu,
Matsushita, Mitsubishi, Toshiba and Toyota) and banks (for example, Fuji Bank and the
Industrial Bank of Japan) to establish themselves in Europe has undoubtedly been prompted
by the fear that firms not established in Europe will not have fair access to the lucrative
European market. This fear is not unfounded as the EC has made greater use of antidumping duties against Japanese producers of printers, cassettes, video tapes, photocopiers
and electrical motors. As a result of this fear, direct Japanese investment in Europe has been
growing at around 90 per cent a year.
There is also some evidence to show that Japanese or other non-European firms, once
established in Europe, might have been discriminated against. Standards and regulations
might have been set to favour European firms, strict local content rules could have been
enforced and public procurement contracts have not been granted to non-European firms in

spite of much more competitive bids from them. An example is the decision by the Spanish
Government to accept French and German tenders for its high-speed railway system in spite
of these being 30 per cent higher than a tender by Mitsubishi.
The extent to which these measures become a permanent feature of the EC after 1992 will
depend on the outcome of debate among EC countries themselves on the relative merits of
competition and regulation. Some countries believe that the prime objective of the 1992
scheme is to give European firms a competitive edge over non-EC ones, whereas others
believe that it is to encourage greater competition and freer trade. All the major decisions
are still pending.
What is clear so far is that with its bargaining strength the EC will insist and be accorded
rules of reciprocity which would deny Asian firms/countries access to the European market
unless equal access is granted to European firms/countries. The implementation of such
reciprocity rules will affect small and open trading nations such as Australia very
significantly. Suppose the EC insists that Northeast Asia buys more of its subsidised
agricultural products before allowing it greater access to the EC market for manufactured
goods. Australia accounts for 2 per cent and 3.7 per cent of Northeast Asian exports and
imports respectively. These figures show Australia to be an unimportant trading partner as
far as Northeast Asia is concerned. Under pressure and threat from the EC and because of
the size of the EC market (US$3,794 billion), there is little doubt that Northeast Asia will
reduce its import of cheaper Australian agricultural products rather than reduce its
domestic production of such products in order to accede to the EC's request.
If the 1992 Europe plan results in a North American trading bloc, the situation for Australia
would be worse. The North American trading bloc could exert the same type of pressure on
Northeast Asia. As it accounts for 39 per cent and 21 per cent of Northeast Asian exports
and imports respectively, and has a market of 270 million people and a GDP of US$4,509
billion, there is also little doubt that Australian interests would again be sacrificed.
Diversion of funds from Asia
The third area of concern is that the EC 1992 plan will divert private and public EC capital
away from Asian countries. This would happen for two reasons. The first is that the newer
and poorer EC members, Spain and Portugal, will compete with developing Asian countries
for private investment from richer EC countries because they have more or less the same
factor endowments. As members of the EC, Spain and Portugal will have a huge advantage,
one that will be further strengthened by the operation of the Regional Fund of the EC
Commission which subsidises capital expenditure in the less developed areas of the EC. In
the absence of the 1992 Europe plan, private investment fund could have found its way to
Asia.
The second reason is the special trade and aid programs which have been worked out for
eastern European countries to help them develop their market economic systems. The EC
has agreed to give these countries preferential market access and the newly established
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and other Western donors appear
keen to support the reform process with massive injections of public funds. If the granting
of special trade preferences and special aid programs to eastern Europe were to result in

the successful economic transformation of their economies, this would increase the EC's
private investment in them and reduce such investment in the developing nations of Asia. It
might also increase investment in the EC to facilitate exports to eastern Europe, thereby
reducing further direct foreign investment in Asia.
While such a development might come about even without the 1992 Europe plan, it would
be more likely with it in place. The EC would like to see the East European countries adopt
political and economic systems which are similar to its own. As the 1992 Europe plan is
supposed to demonstrate the superiority of factor and trade mobility under a marketdetermined economic system, the EC would be particularly keen to help the eastern
European countries integrate into the international division of labour.
The concern that western European private and public funds will be diverted from Asia may
be exaggerated. First, direct foreign investment has already begun to move away from
developing countries as a group (table 2). The share of the Asian NIEs and near-NIEs in the
total direct foreign investment went down from 6.6 per cent in 1980-84 to 5.5 per cent in
1988, though their share in the direct foreign investment going to developing countries
went up and by 1988 had accounted for half of this. Second, over the 1980s the EC had
become a more attractive place for investment for both EC and non-EC countries, with Spain
and Portugal being preferred. This pro-EC investment trend will be strengthened by the
1992 plan as the EC provides subsidies for investment in its peripheral areas and as non-EC
investors move in to benefit from its larger market and for fear of the EC adopting a
predatory policy. However, the point is that the EC 1992 plan will only continue a trend
which began some years back. Third, with economic growth in Spain and Portugal, labour
costs will rise and make them less attractive investment destinations. Their participation in
the European Monetary System will also mean that they cannot adjust their exchange rates
to deal with rising labour costs. Moreover, the social harmonisation program of the EC will
reduce the inter-country differences in labour costs. As a result, Spain and Portugal will lose
their comparative advantage in labour- intensive activities and attention will switch back to
the developing Asian countries.

The concern that political and economic developments in eastern Europe will divert funds
from Asia may also be exaggerated. Most of these countries are heavily indebted in hard
currencies and it is highly unlikely that they will be able to borrow significant amounts from
the private capital market. Their ability to absorb direct foreign investment and foreign aid
is also limited. This is because physical and institutional infrastructures are poor, there is no
experience and skill in managing large-scale investment projects, the market is in an
embryonic stage and property rights are not protected.
Political considerations will result in a significant increase in private and public EC funds
being channelled into eastern Europe but it will not be of a magnitude that will starve
developing Asian countries of such funds from the EC. Some Asian countries, especially the
South Asian ones, will suffer more, particularly as far as the receipt of foreign aid is
concerned. Others, especially the Asian NIEs and near-NIEs, will benefit from the increased
demand for capital goods arising from the economic reconstruction of eastern Europe. The
dynamic economic performances of these Asian countries will continue to attract EC direct
investment. If the demands of eastern European reconstruction are to be met it will be
more likely to be at the expense of investment in the peripheral areas of the EC.
Conclusions
If the EC were to adopt an outward-looking strategy in its dealings with the rest of the world
after 1992 and if beggar-my-neighboui" policies are not adopted by the various trade blocs,
the major trading nations of Asia will benefit from the 1992 exercise. An increase in the EC's

GDP will increase its demand for imports, which will the negate the trade diversion effect
and increase the level of economic activity in the rest of the world. Those Asian countries
which are efficient producers of goods demanded by the EC will benefit. They will also
benefit from the increase in demand for capital goods that will accompany the economic
reconstruction of the East European countries. The past economic and export performances
of the Asian NIEs and near-NIEs suggest that they will be the ones most likely to gain from
these developments in western and eastern Europe.
These gains can be strengthened by a more sustained effort to break into the European
market. Asian NIEs and near-NIEs account for only a relatively small part of the EC's imports.
They have tended to concentrate on the American market, partly because of its large size
and partly because the American dollar has been over-valued. The gains can also be
increased by a more targeted approach to marketing in Europe. Protectionist measures will
remain for sectors such as agriculture, some steel products, cars, textiles and clothing and
some electronics products, where structural adjustment is overdue, and may even increase
for sectors considered important for the future such as aircraft and telecommunications.
These measures have also been concentrated on Japan and the Asian NIEs, which need to
diversify their exports to the EC by moving away from highly protected industries into the
less protected capital goods sector.
The effectiveness of the Asian response will be increased by investing directly in the EC. This
has been recognised by the Japanese and their direct investment in the EC in recent years
has increased very substantially. It is a step which should be considered very seriously by
the Asian NIEs and near-NIEs, as the EC may react to the pain of structural adjustment
within its boundaries by reducing competition from outside.
On balance, the Europe 1992 plan should be seen as a boon and not a bane for the major
trading nations of Asia. Other Asian countries, especially those which have to depend on
foreign aid to make ends meet, will find the going a great deal more difficult. But such
countries will find things tough whether or not the 1992 plan takes place.
[Footnote]
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